his best students later remarked that by the end of the speech «one did not know whether one should read the Pre-Socratics or march with the Storm Troopers». 6 Bestowing early respectability on the fledgling regime of the new Chancellor Adolf Hitler (named by President Paul von Hindenburg on January 30, 1933), Heidegger declared to the students (October, 1933) : «Let not doctrinal propositions and "ideas" be the rules of your Being. The Führer himself and alone is the present and future German reality and its law.
[…] Heil Hitler!» 7 For various reasons, mainly and mostly political and professional,
Heidegger resigned as rector of the university after a year in office. 8 His later claims to the contrary notwithstanding, 9 it is hard to maintain the thesis that he was active in the opposition to the regime of the Third Reich (1933 Reich ( -1945 .
Despite the fact that he had to submit to de-Nazification procedures by Allied, German, and academic authorities after the Second World War, which led first to his forced retirement without permission to teach and finally to his emeritus status with permission to teach (with a kind of nervous breakdown in between), 10 the exact extent of Heidegger's involvement with National Socialism did not emerge until long after his death. During his lifetime, he was able to sustain the self-serving story according to which he had been an innocent, naïve dreamer who had gotten romantically involved in politics way over his head, but not a convinced Nazi.
11
In his signature «Letter on Humanism» (1947), Heidegger deftly, even aggressively, deflected an open invitation to face up to and to come to grips with the Third Reich and his association with it, stubbornly refusing to rethink within a humanistic horizon what it meant to be human after the Second World War and the mass murder of innumerable combatants and civilians by Germany and its allies.
12 6 Cf. Löwith, 1986 Löwith, /2007 7 GA 16, 184-185: «Nicht Lehrsätze und "Ideen" seien die Regeln Eures Seins. Der Führer selbst und allein ist die heutige und künftige deutsche Wirklichkeit und ihr Gesetz.
[…] Heil Hitler!» Unless otherwise noted, all translations in this paper are my own. 8 Heidegger was Rector from April 21, 1933 , to April 27, 1934 . Cf. Ott, 1988 , 131-246, and Thomä, 2013 Cf. GA 16, 372-394, 397-401, 409-415, etc. Cf. also Heidegger, Letter to Karl Jaspers, July 5, 1949 , in Heidegger & Jaspers, 1990 , 173. 10 Cf. GA 16, 367-448, and Thomä, 2013 Cf., e.g., Heidegger, Letter to Hannah Arendt, April 12, 1950 , in Arendt & Heidegger, 1998 /2002 Politischen bin ich weder bewandert noch begabt. Aber inzwischen lernte ich und künftig möchte ich noch mehr lernen, auch im Denken nichts auszulassen.» 12 Cf. GA 9, 313-364. The letter was composed in 1945, first published with «Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit» It did not help that Heidegger proposed an analogy between what Germans had done to their victims during the war and what some Allies did to some Germans after the war (1948) , 13 compared industrialized agriculture to the production of corpses in the gas chambers and extermination camps (1949), 14 and suggested that the innumerable people who had «died» in the annihilation camps had not died (1949) . 15 In his Introduction to Metaphysics (1953 Metaphysics ( [lectures from 1935 ), Heidegger even seemed to suggest that the tragedy of National Socialism was not that it had failed, but rather that it had never been tried, at least not by those who understood «the inner truth and greatness of this movement» («die innere Wahrheit und Größe dieser Bewegung»).
16
In public Heidegger never expressed regret or remorse in regard to his involvement with National Socialism. 17 In private he did so only very rarely, for example, in a few letters to his former colleague Karl Jaspers and his former lover Hannah Arendt. 18 He was not only unapologetic, but he also tried to portray himself as an ardent but prudent critic of the regime, for example, in his revisionist, posthumously released, interview with the German news magazine Der Spiegel (1966) .
19
In his Black Notebooks, a kind of intellectual-philosophical diaries that he began before the Third Reich and continued after it, Heidegger occasionally but indirectly expresses his growing disappointment and mounting disillusionment with some of the realities of the regime. Yet he provides no criticism of the ideals of National Socialism as he wished to understand it. 20 Also, nowhere in the Black Notebooks does Heidegger question the anti-Semitic theories or practices of National Socialism.
After Heidegger's death, scholars gradually uncovered more and more evidence («Plato's Doctrine of Truth») in 1947, and then as a separate monograph in 1949. 13 Cf. Heidegger, Letter to Herbert Marcuse, January 20, 1948, in GA 16, 431. 14 Cf. Heidegger, 1994, 26-27. 15 Cf. Heidegger, 1994, 53. 16 Cf. Heidegger, 1953 what is peddled about nowadays as the philosophy of National Socialism […] has not the least to do with the inner truth and greatness of this movement […] .» See the explanation of the context of this quotation in the introduction by Fried and Polt, It is reported that Heidegger did once describe his rectorship and his related engagement for the regime as «the greatest stupidity of his life» («die größte Dummheit seines Lebens»). Cf. Petzet, 1983, 43. 18 Cf. Heidegger, Letter to Karl Jaspers, March 7, 1950 , in Heidegger & Jaspers, 1990 , 196-197, and Heidegger, Letter to Hannah Arendt, May 4, 1950 , in Arendt & Heidegger, 1998 /2002 Cf. Heidegger, 1976 , Davidson, 1989 , and Hachmeister, 2014 Cf., e.g., GA 95, [408] [409] of the depth and extent of his involvement with National Socialism. In 1987, Victor
Farías caused a sensation with the publication of Heidegger and National Socialism, a book that represented a major contribution to the topic and generated a great deal of controversy. 21 Cf. Farías, 1987 , 1989a , 1989b , and Altwegg, 1988 . 22 Cf. Ott, 1988 . 23 Cf. Faye, 2005 . 24 Cf. Fédier, 2007 Cf . Löwith, 1986 . Löwith, /2007 Cf. Heidegger, 1927 Cf. Husserl, 1997, 1-32, and Thomä, 2013, 35-44. 28 Cf. Malvine Husserl, Letters to Elisabeth Rosenberg, June 22, 1930, and January 25, 1933, in Husserl, Briefwechsel (henceforth: BW) , 429, 433. Cf. also Sepp, 1988 finally the subsequent interpretation of these events by Arendt and Jaspers in Arendt & Jaspers, 1985, 79, 84, 99, 732. 33 Cf. Schuhmann, 1977, 472, and Sepp, 1988, 385. 34 Cf. Heidegger, Letter to Malvine Husserl, March 6, 1950 , in GA 16, 443. Cf. also Ott, 1988 Cf. Trawny, 2014. 40 In the English translation of Trawny's book, Andrew Mitchell renders this terminology as «Being-Historical Anti-Semitism». Yet this way of expressing the phenomenon at issue seems unnecessarily awkward. In any case, Trawny's charge is that Heidegger is guilty of anti-Semitism with respect to the history of Being or that his interpretation of the history of Being is anti-Semitic.
expresses anti-Semitic sentiments. Cf. Heidegger, Letter to Elfride Heidegger, August 12, 1920 , in Heidegger, 2005 Cf. Jaspers, 1977, 46 (quoting Heidegger) : «Es gibt doch eine gefährliche internationale Verbindung der Juden.» 49 Despite disclaimers by his defenders (he did write a letter in defense of Fraenkel on July 12, 1933 [cf. GA 16, 140-141] ), it is very highly likely that Heidegger's denunciation of Baumgarten is genuine. Cf. Ott, 1988, 183-184, and Jaspers, 1990, 168-172 , where Jaspers mentions the case (February 6, 1949 ) and Heidegger does not contradict him (June 22, 1949 And perhaps in this «struggle», in which aimlessness itself is struggled over and which therefore can only be the caricature of a «struggle», the greater groundlessness, which is bound to nothing, and which makes use of everything (Jewry), will «emerge victorious». But the real victory, the victory of history over that which lacks history, will be won only there where that which is groundless excludes itself because it does not risk Being but rather always only reckons with being and posits its calculations as what is actual.
51
He adds for good measure this:
One of the most hidden forms of the gigantic, and perhaps the oldest, is the tough skillfulness of calculating and pushing and mixing together in which the worldlessness of Jewry is grounded.
52 from Jaspers, whose wife, Gertrud Mayer, was Jewish. See again Heidegger's admission of his long-standing academic anti-Semitism in his Letter to Arendt of Winter 1932 /1933 Cf. Trawny, 2014, 11. 51 GA 95, 96-97: «Und vielleicht "siegt" in diesem "Kampf", in dem um die Ziellosigkeit schlechthin gekämpft wird und der daher nur das Zerrbild des "Kampfes" sein kann, die größere Bodenlosigkeit, die an nichts gebunden, alles sich dienstbar macht (das Judentum). Aber der eigentliche Sieg, der Sieg der Geschichte über das Geschichtslose, wird nur dort errungen, wo das Bodenlose sich selbst ausschließt, weil es das Seyn nicht wagt, sondern immer nur mit dem Seienden rechnet und seine Berechnungen als das Wirkliche setzt.» 52 GA 95, 97: «Eine der verstecktesten Gestalten des Riesigen und vielleicht die älteste ist die zähe Geschicklichkeit des Rechnens und Schiebens und Durcheinandermischens, wodurch die Weltlosigkeit des Judentums gegründet wird.» HORIZON 5 (1) 2016
And finally also this:
World Jewry, incited by the emigrants who were allowed to leave Germany, is everywhere incomprehensible, and, with all its expansion of power, does not need to participate in acts of war, whereas we have no other alternative but to sacrifice the best blood of the best of our people. Cf. also GA 95, 161, 325, and GA 96, 133 («das internationale Judentum») . 55 This decision is consistent with the position that Heidegger does not embrace biological racism, though he seems to endorse «intellectual» or «spiritual racism» (GA 94, (142) (143) 189, 191) , analogously to his distinction between «vulgar National Socialism» and «intellectual» or «spiritual National Socialism» («der geistige Nationalsozialismus») (GA 94, 135). 56 Cf. Trawny, 2014, 11. 57 Cf. Trawny, 2014, 31-57. 58 Cf. Trawny, 2014, 31. the Black Notebooks (with enhanced context for better understanding):
[1] For the same reason [a gross ignorance of the essence of Being and its being beyond power and impotence], however, every «pacifism» and every «liberalism» are also not in a position to penetrate into the area of essential decisions, because they only rise to the level of counter-play against genuine and artificial warriordom. The reason for the temporary increase in the power of Jewry, however, lies in the fact that the metaphysics of the West, especially in its modern development, provided the starting place for the spreading of an otherwise empty rationality and calculative capacity, which in this way lodged itself in the «spirit» without being able to grasp the hidden areas of decision on its own. The more original and initial the future decisions and questions become, the more inaccessible they remain to this «race». (Thus Husserl's move to phenomenological observation, which involves distancing oneself against psychological explanation and historical accounting of opinions, is of lasting importance -and yet nowhere does it reach into the areas of essential decisions, but rather presupposes everywhere the historical tradition of philosophy; the necessary consequence shows itself at once in the change of course into Neo-Kantian transcendental philosophy, a change of course that in the end made unavoidable a progression into Hegelianism in the formal sense. My «attack» against Husserl is not directed against him alone and not at all essential -the attack goes against the omission of the question of Being, that is, against the essence of metaphysics as such, on the basis of which the machination of being is able to determine history. The attack grounds a historical moment of the highest decision between the priority of what is and the grounding of the truth of Being.)
59
[2] The fact that in the age of machination race is elevated to the express and especially established «principle» of history (or only of Historie) is not the arbitrary invention of «doctrinaires», but rather a consequence of the power of machination, which must force what is, according to all its areas, into the planned calculation. By means of the thought of race, «life» is brought into the form of breedability that represents a kind of calculation. The Jews, with their emphatically calculating talent, have already been «living» for the longest time according to the principle of race, which is also why they most strongly resist the unrestricted application of the principle. The establishment of racial breeding does not stem from «life» itself, but rather from the overpowering of life by means of machination. What this machination pursues with such planning is a complete de-racing of peoples by means of the harnessing of them into the establishment of all that is, built the same and cut the same. Along with the de-racing goes an alienation of peoples from themselvesthe loss of history -that is, the loss of the areas of decision next to Being. And thus are buried the only possibilities that peoples of their own primordial historical power bring themselves to unity in their counter-agility: for example, the concept that knows and the passion for sense-reflection with the depth and breadth of the uncanny […] .
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[3] Why do we recognize so late that in truth England is and can be without a Western attitude? Because only in the future will we comprehend that England began to set up the modern world, but modernity, according to its essence, is directed toward the unleashing of the machination of the entire globe. The thought of an understanding with England in the sense of a distribution of the «rights» of the imperialisms also does not get at the essence of the historical process that England is now playing out within Americanism and Bolshevism, and that means, at the same time, within world Jewry too. The question about the role of world Jewry is not a racial one, but rather the metaphysical question about the kind of humanity that, without any restraints whatsoever, can take over the uprooting of all that is from Being as a world-historical «task».
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Clearly Heidegger's remarks here are (1) anti-Semitic and (2) Sluga, 1993, 101-124, and Thomä, «Heidegger und der Nationalsozialismus», in Thomä, 2013,108-133, especially 113-125. 63 Cf. the representative sampling of such remarks in Thomä, 2013, 116-117. 64 Cf. Trawny, 2014, 59-69. 65 Cf. Trawny, 2014, 69. There is a need for a very careful reading here. The passage in which Heidegger refers to Husserl in connection with his own ontological-historical anti-Semitism has already been cited, but it deserves closer scrutiny. Properly understood, the passage is a whole that consists of two parts that are in turn conjoined by one transitional but pivotal word. First, Heidegger sets the stage with a series of remarks of a general nature:
[1a] For the same reason [a gross ignorance of the essence of Being and its being beyond power and impotence], however, every «pacifism» and every «liberalism» are also not in a position to penetrate into the area of essential decisions, because they only rise to the level of counter-play against genuine and artificial warriordom. The reason for the temporary increase in the power of Jewry, however, lies in the fact that the metaphysics of the West, especially in its modern development, provided the starting place for the spreading of an otherwise empty rationality and calculative capacity, which in this way lodged itself in the «spirit» without being able to grasp the hidden areas of decision on its own. The more original and initial the future decisions and questions become, the more inaccessible they remain to this «race». In light of the importance of the matter, one should in any case avoid the precipitous conclusion that Heidegger mentions Husserl here because of his own anti-Semitism, ontological-historical or other.
MISSING LINKS IN TRAWNY'S ANALYSIS OF THE HEIDEGGER-HUSSERL RELATIONSHIP
As corroborative evidence for a more nuanced reading than Trawny's, one need only take into account two other passages in the Black Notebooks in which Heidegger mentions Husserl, but in which he does not refer to his or anyone else's being Jewish.
These passages are not from volume 96 but from volume 94 of the Complete Edition, so it is possible to overlook their direct relevance to the issue at hand.
In the first passage, Heidegger, expressing irritation at the cool reception of his recently published On the Essence of Ground (1929) , says with respect to Husserl:
Here it is over with the accounting for «influences» and dependences on Husserl, Dilthey, Kierkegaard, and whatever their names are. Here what should count -if at all -is to get serious about a confrontation with antiquity and with the repeated problem of Being. Instead of that, the prattle obviously mounts up from week to week. 78 77 Cf. Arendt, 1951 /2004 , 82-93, 99, 105-116, and 1963 , 117-119. Cf. also Heidegger, Letter to Hannah Arendt, Winter 1932 /33 (in Arendt & Heidegger, 1998 /2002 , in which he (1) rejects the charge of «"impassioned antiSemitism"», (2) admits to long-standing anti-Semitism «in Universitätsfragen», (3) claims that it has «nothing at all» to do with his «personal relationships to Jews (e.g. Husserl, Misch, Cassirer, and others)», and (4) adds that «above all» it «cannot affect the relationship» to Arendt -a Jew. 78 GA 94, 32: «Hier ist es aus mit dem Nachrechnen von "Einflüssen" und Abhängigkeiten von Husserl, Dilthey, Kierkegaard und wie sie alle heißen. Hier gälte es -wenn schon -Ernst zu machen mit einer Auseinandersetzung mit der Antike und mit dem wiederholten Seinsproblem. Statt dessen häuft sich von Woche zu Woche offenbar das Geschwätz.» HORIZON 5 (1) 2016
Heidegger proceeds to criticize «the idle talk about "philosophy of existence"» («das Gerede über die "Existenzphilosophie"») and those who may be «influenced» by Kierkegaard, Kant, and Hegel, those who «talk like» Hartmann or Cassirer, and those who hold «some rootless and homeless "universal opinion"» («irgendwelche wurzel-und heimatlose "allgemeine Meinung"»). 79 Of all the thinkers who are named in this entry, the only ones who are Jewish are Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945 Cf. Heidegger, 1978, 50. 83 Cf. GA 94, [48] [49] [50] [51] Being, Jaspers's Jewish wife Gertrud (née Mayer) notwithstanding. Has he who utters in thought the principle «to the things themselves» already proved himself as the one with a knowledge of the things themselves? No. He can still unsuspectingly commit an oversight in the matter of thinking and by such an oversight act most unsuspectingly against his own principle -still unable to sacrifice the principle too to the thing. The matter of thinking could demand that the principle in essence transform itself.
«That something (what?) shows itself from out of itself» -is not only another formulation of the principle that the description be appropriate to the thing. Already in that turn of phrase is speaking the turning of thinking to 'Αλńθεια as an essential feature of Being itself in the sense of presence. Husserl not only knows nothing about all this; he resists it. One should really just look up the «Afterword» of the seventy-two year old to the Ideas and recognize that there the same is recorded as the Logos-article of 1910 says. Despite this, the Logical Investigations were a stimulus, not the execution, and not the ability to think the experience of 'Αλńθεια from out of the experience of the forgottenness of Being. 85 84 In this connection, Gregory Fried once suggested to me that for Heidegger Plato was «the first Jew» (!). I agreed, but we both added that, if this is Heidegger's way of thinking, then it is laden with questionable prejudices and tendentious presuppositions. 85 GA 97, 442: «Hat sich, wer im Denken das Prinzip "zu den Sachen selbst" ausspricht, der schon als der Sachkundige bewährt? Nein. Er kann sich in der Sache des Denkens noch arg versehen und bei solchem Versehen am ärgsten gegen sein eigenes Prinzip handeln -unvermögend, auch das Prinzip noch der Sache zu opfern. Die HORIZON 5 (1) 2016
Heidegger draws a harsh conclusion: «By means of a mere principle of this kind ( Expressing not only a philosophical but also a pedagogical critique of Husserl, Heidegger applies these general observations to the particular case of his former teacher:
In his time between 1890 and 1900, Husserl was, through his Logical Investigations, a teacher, even though the foundation of these investigations still moved completely within the traditional field of the doctrine of consciousness. The fact that here, vis-à-vis all empty and accidental argumentation and historical assertion, he simply risked the step into letting see, remains his historical position. Precisely this [is what] his mere adherents and propagandists do not want to see. The false admiration for his later philosophy makes him look ridiculous and makes of him, against his will, a bungler. Everyone who learns, however, is silent about the teacher.
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In these and such passages, one comes closer to a genuine understanding of Heidegger's Sache des Denkens könnte verlangen, daß sich das Prinzip im Wesen wandelt.
"Daß sich (was?) von ihm selbst her zeige" -ist nicht nur eine andere Formulierung des Prinzips der sachgemäßen Beschreibung. In jener Wendung spricht schon die Wendung des Denkens in die 'Αλńθεια als Wesenszug des Seins selbst im Sinne des Anwesens. Von allem diesen weiß Husserl nicht nur nichts; er sperrt sich dagegen. Das 'Nachwort' des 72 jährigen zu den "Ideen" möge man doch nachlesen und erkennen, daß hier das Gleiche festgehalten ist, was der Logosaufsatz von 1910 sagt. Trotzdem waren die "Logischen Untersuchungen" ein Anstoß, nicht der Vollzug und nicht das Vermögen, die Erfahrung der 'Αλńθεια aus der Erfahrung der Vergessenheit des Seins zu denken.» 86 GA 97, 442: «Durch ein bloßes Prinzip dieser Art (Zu den Sachen selbst!) wird man noch nicht ein Sachkundiger.» 87 GA 97, 442-443: «Der echte Lehrer trägt nicht Sätze und Regeln vor. Er läßt lernen. Das Lernen schickt sich an, zu erfahren, zurück-und vorzunehmen, was es zunächst meint und alsbald gesehen hat. Lernen-lassen gibt frei für die Ankunft der Sache; bringt in die Wanderschaft inmitten der Sachen. Husserl. -Ever since Husserl, from 1930/31, in lectures that were really rather rallies (in Berlin and Frankfurt), publicly took position against me and repudiated my work as unphilosophy (cf. the Afterword to his «Ideas» (1930/31)), I have passed him by. I have never undertaken the slightest thing against Husserl. One lies, saying that I expelled him from the university and forbade [him] access to the library. Husserl had been emeritus, at his own wish, since 1928; since then he never again lectured or gave a seminar; he never used the university library, apart from a few exceptions in the years 1920 ff. What was there to expel? His works were never removed from the department library, as that was required for Jewish authors; just as little was ever a National-Socialist book, for example, [one by] Rosenberg and others, acquired, or, as required and also done in the other departments, was ever a «picture of the Führer» hung. I am saying this not by way of defense, but only as a statement, to which this too belongs, namely, that, between 1933 and 44, I, exactly as earlier, in the same objectivity, pointed out the significance of Husserl's phenomenology and the necessity of the study of the «Logical Investigations». There was never uttered a word of criticism, which in fact would have been possible and justified and not a crime, neither in the lectures nor in the seminars. One must, of course, concede, as the strange reference to Husserl's «rallies» («Kundgebungen») in Berlin and other places suggests, that some of Heidegger's language in these passages can be tasteless. He speaks, for example, of «propaganda» against his own way of thinking and of «a great falsification of history»:
I passed Husserl by; that was a painful necessity. One would have interpreted any other attitude of mine too only as a polite gesture. Whoever speaks of «heinous betrayal», however, does not know that he is only talking revenge and knows nothing of that which happened early: that my own way of thinking was interpreted as defection, that one took refuge in propaganda when my way was not to be stopped otherwise. One is now staging a great falsification of history.
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One must also recognize, however, that Heidegger focuses on the fact that the break between him and Husserl had other, philosophical and professional, reasons, and that it had occurred «long before there was talk of National Socialism and persecution of Jews»:
It seems to me, however, that my essays since «Being and Time» are the most worthy testimony for that which I owe Husserl -that I learned from him and testified for his way by the fact that I did not remain his follower, which I also never was. But precisely this violated the rules of the house, long before there was talk of National Socialism and persecution of Jews. Because the slurs and abuses are still in vogue even in the year 1948, [and] no one takes the pains to judge objectively on the basis of objective knowledge or even to go into my writings and to cite the otherwise much used lectures as testimonies for my thinking, let this be once again noted, not for the public, not as a defense, but rather as a statement. Cf. Teacher. 93 91 Cf. again Arendt & Jaspers, 1985, 79, 84, 99, 732. Cf. also Heidegger, GA 16, 639. 92 Cf. Trawny, 2014, p. 85, fns. 15-16, p. 86, fns. 18-19, and p. 88, fn. 22. then transformed into academic anti-Semitism. In this respect, his philosophy did not overcome his Weltanschauung; rather, his Weltanschauung determined his philosophy.
This finding fits into the intellectual landscape of the first decades of the twentieth century, a time during which Husserl attempted to distinguish between philosophy as rigorous science and philosophy as world-view, Jaspers tried to employ psychology and philosophy to understand world-views, and Heidegger was skeptical of the distinction between philosophies and world-views. Naturally, one cannot know with absolute, adequate, and apodictic certainty that there is no anti-Semitism or ontological-historical anti-Semitism whatsoever in Heidegger's critique of Husserl in the Black Notebooks. For it is one thing to argue that Heidegger's «attack» on Husserl is primarily philosophical in character, and another thing to claim that it is purely philosophical in nature. A remnant of doubt is ineradicable.
Yet the fact that Trawny's suggested reading is not inconceivable does not mean that 95 Cf. Husserl, 1911 , Jaspers, 1919 /1971 , and Heidegger, 1919 -1921 it is plausible. Moreover, although Trawny points out that one must get beyond the personal and political dimensions in determining whether «Heidegger's philosophical rejection of Husserlian phenomenology was contaminated by an ontological-historical Cf. Trawny, 2014, 86-87. 98 Cf. again Husserl, 1997, 1-32, as well as Thomä, 2013, 35-44, and Vetter, Grundriss Heidegger, 68-72. way to make clear that his «attack» on Husserl is based on his conviction that his former 
«Platonic», (3) «Christian», (4) «Western», (5) «metaphysical», (6) «modern», and (7) «essentialist». Whatever these designations are supposed to mean (and this is not the place to reconstitute their precise meanings from the Black Notebooks), this is a long and tall list of supposed philosophical shortcomings to overcome. According to Heidegger, of course, Husserl shares all of them. Heidegger was willing, however, to listen to and learn from Husserl until sometime between the first edition of the Logical Investigations (1900/1901) and the Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy (1913) . In the Black Notebooks, Heidegger once again makes clear that, on top of everything else, Husserl's turn from philosophy as descriptive psychology to philosophy as transcendental phenomenology, accompanied by a rigorously scientific insistence on the method of reduction and eidetic intuition, meant that he could no longer follow him who had, in his own eyes, forsaken «the things themselves» in favor of thoughts of the things themselves as such (noemata). Yet this departure of the student from the way of the teacher has been known and understood for a long time, and it has never been connected with anti-In the end, one is left wondering: Given that Heidegger thinks that he has so much to criticize Husserl for, why does he even mention his name in the vicinity of any of his own anti-Semitic remarks? Heidegger says that it is because he is emphasizing that his critique is strictly philosophical and has nothing to do with the Jewish question, whereas Trawny seeks to exploit the sheer proximity of the mention in order to bolster his case Cf. again GA 96, [46] [47] and GA 97, [462] [463] . 100 Cf. again Trawny, 2014, 86-87. 101 Cf. Heidegger, 1927 Heidegger, /1977 ff. Much of the argument of Chapter Three, especially that of § § 19-21, though ostensibly directed at Descartes, can be read as a critique of Husserl. Heidegger's critique of the dominance of the theoretical approach in philosophy is already evident in the earliest extant lecture courses that he gave in the War Emergency Semester of 1919 at the University of Freiburg. Cf. Heidegger, 1987 /1999 Cf., e.g., Heidegger, 1927 , § § 39-44, and Husserl, 1976 psychology in the Logical Investigations (1900/1901) he was involved in the formation of a philosophical system of the kind which he [Husserl] had always considered it [his own] life's work to make forever impossible». 
